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Free Exercise in Foster Care:
Defining the Scope of Religious Rights for
Foster Children and Their Families
Kelsi Brown Corkrant

The First Amendment establishes the right of individuals to exercise their religious beliefs without undue government interference,
and the Supreme Court has affirmed that this right extends to parents
with regard to decisions about their children's religious upbringing.2
Although the Court has repeatedly recognized that children have religious exercise rights of their own,3 it has yet to decide a case involving
a religious conflict between a parent and a child. This is partly because
the bulk of parental interference with children's religious activity occurs in private homes, outside the realm of "state action," which means
that children cannot claim that their free exercise rights are violated

by their parents' actions.!
In contrast, the rearing of foster children occurs entirely under
state authority. When the government takes custody of a child, it controls the nature of her religious opportunities and upbringing; all religious activity (or nonactivity) in foster care necessarily involves state
action.As a result, the free exercise rights of legal parents, foster chil-

dren, and foster parents may all be implicated when their religious
t B.A. 1998, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. and M.PE Candidate 2005, The University of
Chicago.
1
US Const Amend I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof").
2
Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 205, 213-14 (1972) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause
protects "the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their
children").
3
See, for example, West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624 (1943)
(holding that the state's punishment of Jehovah's Witness children for refusing to salute the
American flag constituted a violation of the free exercise rights of both the children and their
parents).
4
For a more expansive view on the role of state action in parental control over children's
religious activity, see Emily Buss, What Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 2 U Pa J Const L 53, 63-66
(1999) (arguing that "[a] strong claim can be made that the State is implicated every time a parent restricts the exercise of a child's fundamental rights").
5
See Part I.C for a more in-depth discussion of the role of state action in foster homes.
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preferences clash during a child's stay in foster care. Suppose that
Muslim foster parents care for a fourteen-year-old child who recently
converted to Buddhism but whose legal parents' want her to practice
Catholicism. To the extent that these religious interests are mutually
exclusive, whose free exercise rights should prevail?
Although this question has no easy answer, this Comment attempts to define the boundaries of each party's religious rights in the
context of foster care. Ultimately, I argue that three principles should
guide the state and courts in mediating religious conflict in foster care.
First, legal parents are constitutionally entitled to reasonable efforts
by foster parents to accommodate their religious preferences with
regard to their children. Second, foster children are also constitutionally entitled to reasonable efforts to accommodate their religious interests, and their preferences, when voluntarily expressed and reasonably articulated, should take priority over the preferences of their
legal parents. Third, the state cannot constitutionally require foster
parents to make more than reasonable efforts to accommodate the
religious preferences of legal parents and/or foster children if doing so
infringes upon their own religious exercise.
I. THE NATURE OF FOSTER CARE IN THE UNITED STATES

More than 500,000 children are in foster care in the United
States; almost half of them are above the age of eleven.' Although
some parents voluntarily relinquish custody, most foster children are
placed in foster care pursuant to a court finding that their legal parents are unable to care for them adequately. Possible reasons for foster care placement include abuse, neglect, and abandonment. Some
legal parents eventually lose their parental rights, placing their children up for adoption by other families, but this happens in fewer than
25 percent of cases.8 This Comment focuses on the other 75 percent of
foster children: those whose legal parents have not had their parental
rights terminated because the permanency goal for the child is either
long-term foster care or reunification with a legal parent or other family member. In addition, although some foster children live in residential institutions, this Comment focuses on free exercise conflict in the
context of family foster care; that is, when children are placed in pri6
In the foster care system, the term "legal parent" encompasses all persons with a legal
right to custody of the child prior to foster care placement, and can refer to a biological parent,
an adoptive parent, or a legal guardian.
7
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, The AFCARS Report (2003), online at www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/afcars/
report8.htm (visited Nov 16,2004).
8
Id.
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vate homes with families that have contracted with the state to provide foster care services.9

Parts II, III, and IV analyze the religious rights of each partylegal parents, foster children, and foster parents -in turn. As a preface
to this discussion, this Part addresses three important preliminary issues: the history of religious matching in foster care placements, the
limited application of the religious matching debate and resulting
policies to post-placement religious conflict, and the extent to which
religious activity or nonactivity in foster homes falls within the ambit
of state action.
A. Religious Matching in Foster Care Placements
Many states have "religious matching" statutes that require foster
care agencies to make reasonable efforts to place children with foster
families of the same religious affiliation as their legal parents.0 Even
in states that lack such a statute, religion is usually considered in foster
care placement." New York's religious matching statute was challenged in a series of cases known as the Wilder litigation. 2 Shirley
Wilder, a thirteen-year-old foster child, challenged New York's prac9 Seventy-six percent of foster children live with families in private homes. Id.
10 See, for example, Ark Code Ann § 9-9-102(c) (Michie 2003) (requiring, at the request of
a biological parent, the placement of an adoptive or foster child in a household with parents of
the requested religion or, failing that, with "a family of a different religious background which is
knowledgeable and appreciative of the child's religious background"); Cal Welf & Inst Code
§ 205 (West 2004) (requiring, so far as practicable, the placement of children "in family homes of
the same religious belief as that of the person so committed or of his parents"); Conn Gen Stat
Ann § 17a-96 (West 2004) (requiring, if practicable, placement of children in "a home of like
religious faith to that of the parent or parents of such child"); 20 ILCS Ann 505/7 (West 2004)
(requiring placement of a child, as far as possible, "in the care and custody of some individual
holding the same religious belief as the parents of the child"); Mass Ann Laws ch 119, § 33 (Lexis
2004) (requiring consideration of "all factors relevant to the child's physical, mental and moral
health" in placing a child in foster care); Minn Stat Ann § 260C.193(3)(c) (West 2004) (requiring
placement of a child "with an individual who meets the birth parent's religious preference" if
that preference is expressed); NY Soc Serv Law § 373(1) (McKinney 2004) (requiring, whenever
practicable, religious matching for children in foster care); W Va Code Ann § 49-2-1 (Michie
2003) (requiring, where practicable, placement of a child with "a family holding the same religious belief as the parents or relatives of the child").
11 All states consider the "best interests" of the child in choosing a foster home, and religious compatibility is a factor in such determinations. See 42 USC § 672(e) (2000) (making federal funding for foster care conditional on a judicial determination that a foster care placement is
in the "best interests" of the child); Annotation, Religion as Factor in Adoption Proceedings,48
ALR3d 383 § 3 (1973) (discussing court proceedings in which judges have considered religious
compatibility as a factor in determining the best interests of a child).
12 See Wilder v Sugarman, 385 F Supp 1013 (SD NY 1974) (three judge panel) (initially
ruling on the constitutionality of New York's religious matching statute); Wilder v Bernstein, 499
F Supp 980 (SD NY 1980) (granting class certification to plaintiffs); Wilder v Bernstein, 645 F
Supp 1292 (SD NY 1986) (holding that the settlement agreement was constitutional); Wilder v
Bernstein, 848 F2d 1338 (2d Cir 1988) (affirming final approval of the settlement agreement).
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tice of religious matching as a violation of the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses of the Constitution." In settlement, the state of New
York agreed to limit religious matching to the extent necessary to ensure that all
children had equal access to high quality foster care
4

placement.
The settlement was later challenged, eventually leading to the

Second Circuit's decision in Wilder v Bernstein." The Second Circuit
held that religious matching is permissible but not required by the
First Amendment.'" Although the court noted that the Establishment
Clause prohibits "excessive government entanglement with religion,"'7
it recognized that it would be impossible for the state to be uninvolved in the religious upbringing of children in its custody." Citing
cases involving religious activity at prisons, hospitals, and military
bases," the court held that the foster care system creates a state responsibility "to make provision for the religious needs of those in its
care." However, the court emphasized that the free exercise rights of
legal parents and foster children are not absolute, and asserted that
the First Amendment does not give legal parents a constitutional right

to "state-sponsored parenting under the religious auspices" of their
choice." The court concluded that the state is required only to make

"reasonable efforts" to accommodate the religious preferences of legal parents and foster children.2

13 See Martin Guggenheim, State-Supported Foster Care: The Interplay Between the Prohibition of Establishing Religion and the Free Exercise Rights of Parents and Children: Wilder v.
Bernstein, 56 Brooklyn L Rev 603,612-13 (1990). Wilder also brought an equal protection claim,
but it will not be discussed here because it is outside the scope of this Comment.
14 Wilder v Bernstein,645 F Supp at 1304-07.
15 848 F2d 1338 (2d Cir 1988).
16 Id at 1346-49.
17 Id at 1342, citing Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 US 602, 612-13 (1971) (holding that state
action is permissible under the Establishment Clause only if it has a secular purpose, its primary
effect is one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and it does not foster excessive government entanglement with religion).
18 See Wilder, 848 F2d at 1347.
19 See Cruz v Beto, 405 US 319 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that prisoners maintain their
constitutional rights to free exercise of religion, tempered but not elided by the necessary latitude courts accord to prison officials in administering their institutions); Carter v Broadlawns
Medical Center,667 F Supp 1269 (SD Iowa 1987) (holding that a tax-supported county hospital
may hire a chaplain and provide space for worship services because, while such activities do
entail state entanglement in religion, proscribing such activities violates patients' free exercise
rights); Katcoff v Marsh, 755 F2d 223 (2d Cir 1985) (holding that the Army does not generally
violate the Establishment Clause by hiring chaplains to enable soldiers to practice the religion of
their choice while stationed at a military base).
20
Wilder, 848 F2d at 1342.
21 Id at 1346-47.
22
Id at 1347.
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Following the Wilder litigation, numerous commentators discussed the constitutionality of religious matching, with varying conclusions.i For the most part, commentators agreed with the Second Circuit's assertion that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit the
state from accommodating the religious preferences of legal parents
and foster children." Similarly, this Comment assumes that, in the context of foster care, the Establishment Clause requires only that the
state remain neutral between different religions and does not prohibit

religious activity altogether in foster homes."
There is also consensus among post-Wilder commentators that the
Free Exercise Clause does not give legal parents an absolute right to

control the religious affiliation of their child's foster care placement."
Disagreement is centered primarily on the extent to which the state is
obligated, if at all, to consider the religious preferences of legal parents
when children are placed in foster care. Some of this debate is relevant
for the purposes of this Comment and will be discussed in Part II.
B.

Post-Placement Religious Activity

Neither Wilder nor existing scholarship addresses the religious
activity that occurs in foster homes after a child's placement. If the

23
See, for example, Michael P Kennedy, Comment, In the Best Interest of the Child: Religious and Racial Matching in Foster Care,3 Geo Mason U Civ Rts L J 299 (1993) (arguing that
racial and religious matching are antithetical to both the best interests of foster children and the
Constitution); Guggenheim, 56 Brooklyn L Rev 603 (cited in note 13) (arguing that the Wilder
settlement was a good one, despite the fact that it will likely hinder the free exercise rights of
some children); Gregory A. Horowitz, Note, Accommodation and Neutrality Under the Establishment Clause: The Foster Care Challenge, 98 Yale L J 617 (1989) (arguing that the "free exercise accommodation" developed in other areas of state action is inapplicable to the foster care
context and suggesting instead an "establishment clause accommodation doctrine").
24 But see Kennedy, Comment, 3 Geo Mason U Civ Rts L J at 319-22 (cited in note 23)
(arguing that religious matching is never religiously neutral and therefore violates the Establishment Clause).
25
As discussed by the Second Circuit in Wilder, 848 F2d at 1347-49, extensive case law
supports this assumption. See note 19 and accompanying text. See also School Districtof Abington Township, Pennsylvania v Schempp, 374 US 203, 296-99 (1963) (Brennan concurring) (arguing that the state must be neutral, neither favoring nor inhibiting religion, but that the denial of
reasonable religious opportunities represents hostility as opposed to neutrality).
26 See Thomas J. Cunningham, ConsideringReligion as a Factor in Foster Care in the Aftermath of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith and the Religious
Freedom RestorationAct, 28 U Richmond L Rev 53, 89-90 (1994) (stating that although the right
to direct the religious development of one's child "does not disappear simply because a parent
releases custody of the child," the legal parents' rights "are not absolute"); Kennedy, Comment, 3
Geo Mason U Civ Rts L J at 314 (cited in note 23) (arguing that the Free Exercise Clause does
not require the placement of foster children in religiously compatible homes); Guggenheim, 56
Brooklyn L Rev at 619 (cited in note 13) ("[T]he better view is that the state owes a constitutional obligation to parents to accommodate their free exercise rights to raise their children in a
particular religion whenever it is possible for the state to do so.").

The University of Chicago Law Review

[72:325

foster parents and legal parents do not hold the same religious beliefs,
are the foster parents required to ensure that the child follows the
religious preferences of the legal parents? What if a child's placement
is religiously matched, but the legal parent experiences a religious
conversion? What if the child wishes to practice a different religion
altogether?
Two district court cases, Walker v Johnson27 and Pfoltzer v County
of Fairfax,2 illustrate this sort of post-placement religious conflict. In
Walker, the legal mother, who expressed no religious preference at the
time of placement but later converted to Judaism, claimed that her
free exercise rights were violated when the foster parents took her
children to Protestant religious services against her wishes and failed
to teach them the tenets of Judaism.2' In Pfoltzer, the legal mother
claimed that the foster parents' failure to regularly take her children
to Catholic mass and religious instruction classes constituted a violation of her free exercise rights. The holdings of these cases are discussed at greater length in Parts II and III; the point here is that postplacement religious conflicts do occur, and that academic and jurisprudential theories regarding religious matching are inadequate to
address them.
C.

State Action and Foster Homes

A final preliminary issue is whether the state is responsible when
foster parents' actions or nonactions hinder the religious exercise of
children in their care. Because the First Amendment prohibits only
the government, and not private parties, from interfering in the exercise of religion, it is important to consider whether legal parents and
foster children can raise legally cognizable free exercise challenges
based on religious activity or the lack thereof in foster homes.
Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of
whether foster parents are state actors, numerous appellate and district courts have held that, for the purposes of 42 USC § 1983," foster

parents are not themselves state actors.32 This means that foster par891 F Supp 1040 (MD Pa 1995).
775 F Supp 874 (ED Va 1991), affd, 966 F2d 1443 (4th Cir 1992) (unpublished).
29
891 F Supp at 1046-47.
30
775 F Supp at 881 n 14.
31 42 USC § 1983 (2000) (creating liability for those acting under the color of law who
deprive a citizen of any right, privilege, or immunity granted by the Constitution).
32
See, for example, Rayburn v Hogue, 241 F3d 1341 (11th Cir 2001); Milburn v Anne
Arundel County Department of Social Services, 871 F2d 474 (4th Cir 1989); PG. v Ramsey
County, 141 F Supp 2d 1220 (D Minn 2001); Walker, 891 F Supp 1040; Lintz v Skipski, 807 F
Supp 1299 (WD Mich 1992). But see Howard v Malac,270 F Supp 2d 132 (D Mass 2003) (holding that a foster parent should be considered a state actor for the purposes of a lawsuit under
27

28

2005]

Religious Rights for FosterChildren and Their Families

331

ents cannot be held civilly liable for violating the constitutional rights
of children in their care, nor is the state automatically vicariously liable for their actions.

33

However, state child welfare departments and

the private agencies with which they contract are state actors. As a
result, most courts have held that when the state or foster care agency
knows that a child is being abused in a foster home and does not attempt to prevent that abuse, it has violated the Fourteenth Amend-

ment rights of that child and is liable under § 1983." Put more broadly,
it is impossible for foster parents to violate the constitutional rights of
a child in their care, but if the state knowingly fails to ensure that a
child is able to exercise her constitutionally protected rights while in

foster care, then the state has violated her rights.
In the context of religious exercise claims, this means that once a
legal parent or a foster child informs the state (or foster care agency)
that the child is unable to freely exercise her religious beliefs due to

action or nonaction by the foster parents, the state becomes responsible for ensuring that she is able to engage in religious exercise to the

extent required by the First Amendment."
This understanding of state action in foster care is consistent with
Wilder, Walker, and Pfoltzer. In each of these cases, the court assumed
that the social service agencies that supervise foster care placements
are state actors and that they are directly accountable for the actions

and nonactions of the foster parents under their supervision with regard to religious activity.M It is reasonable to conclude, then, that foster
home activity is subject to constitutional constraints on government
action, including the Free Exercise Clause.

§ 1983 where the foster parent colluded with state Department of Social Service agents in her
actions).
33
Given that the state closely supervises foster parents and maintains exclusive legal custody of the children in their care, this line of cases is questionable. As one commentator has
persuasively argued, the nature of foster parenting strongly suggests that "foster parents perform
an exclusive state function." Terrence J. Dee, Note, Foster Parent Liability Under Section 1983:
FosterParents' Liability as State Actors for Abuse to Foster Children,69 Wash U L 0 1201, 122829 (1991) (arguing that foster parents should be considered state actors for the purpose of liability under § 1983).
34 See, for example, Murphy v Morgan, 914 F2d 846 (7th Cir 1990) (holding that state child
welfare workers were not entitled to qualified immunity for placing a child in the custody of a
known or suspected child abuser); Donlan v Ridge, 58 F Supp 2d 604 (ED Pa 1999) (holding that
a nonprofit foster care agency could be considered a state actor for the purposes of liability
under § 1983 because it performed a function that was the exclusive prerogative of the state);
Del A. v Roemer, 777 F Supp 1297, 1318 (ED La 1991) (holding that a state agency exposes itself
to liability under § 1983 "when a decision by the professional [state employee] is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that
the professional actually did not base the decision on such a judgment").
35
As stated earlier, the meaning of "extent required" is the subject of this Comment.
36
See Wilder, 848 F2d at 1347; Walker, 891 F Supp at 1048-49; Pfoltzer,755 F Supp at 885.
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II. THE FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS OF LEGAL PARENTS

In Wisconsin v Yoder,37 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding
in Prince v Massachusetts" that parents have a constitutional right to
give their children "religious training and to encourage them in the
practice of religious belief." 9 The Yoder Court held that this right cannot be infringed upon by the government unless parental religious decisions "jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential
for significant social burdens."' In other words, the Court imposed a
compelling interest requirement on state action that interferes with the
ability of parents to control the religious upbringing of their children.'
This Part discusses whether legal parents maintain any right to
determine the religious upbringing of their children after the state has
taken custody of them. I conclude that the free exercise rights of legal
parents require that the state make at least, but no more than, reasonable efforts to accommodate their religious preferences.
A. The Reasonable Efforts Test
The Supreme Court has not addressed the extent of parental free
exercise rights in the context of foster care. In Wilder, the Second Circuit held that the failure to undertake religious matching in a child's
foster care placement does not violate the religious rights of legal parents or children. 2 With regard to religious activity after a child has
been placed in a foster home, the court asserted in dicta that the free
exercise rights of parents and children require only that the state
make "reasonable efforts" to accommodate their religious practices.3
Two district courts have applied this standard in the context of postplacement religious exercise claims by legal parents.
1. Pfoltzer v Fairfax County.

As discussed earlier, the legal mother in Pfoltzer claimed that the
state violated her religious exercise rights by failing to accommodate
37

406 US 205,233-34 (1972).

321 US 158 (1944) (recognizing the rights of children to exercise their religion and of
parents to control the religious choices of their children, subject to certain limitations).
39 Id at 165.
40 406 US at 234.
41
See Comment, Adjudicating What Yoder Left Unresolved: Religious Rights for Minor
Children After Danforth and Carey, 126 U Pa L Rev 1135, 1145 (1978) (stating that the Yoder
holding "might be read as establishing that the first amendment's free exercise provisions vest in
the parents a constitutionally-protected right to direct their child's religious upbringing in the
absence of any compelling reason for state interference").
42
848 F2d at 1346-47.
38

43

Id at 1347.
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her request that her children regularly attend Catholic mass and religious instruction classes." The court adopted the reasonable efforts
test from Wilder, asserting that although free religious exercise is of
"signal constitutional importance," the state cannot be expected to

"satisfy the parents' every request with respect to ...children's reli-

gious instruction."5 The court found that although the Pfoltzer children did not attend Catholic mass or religious instruction classes
every week, their foster parents made reasonable efforts to take them

to mass or at least made the opportunity available to them. ' Thus, the

court held, the legal mother's "free exercise rights were adequately
observed."4'
2. Walker v Johnson.
In Walker, the legal mother based her free exercise challenge on
the failure of the state to accommodate her requests that her children

not attend Protestant religious services and that they learn the basic
tenets of Judaism. The Walker court also established a reasonable efforts standard for religious accommodation in foster care."4 Although
the legal mother did not express any religious preference at the time
of her children's placement and had a religious history "checkered
with indecision," the court accepted as valid her conversion to Judaism
and her request that her children follow the tenets of the Jewish
faith.0 The right of a parent to rear her child as she sees fit, asserted
the court, is "not eviscerated solely because she has not been a model

parent."'
The court emphasized, however, that the best interests of the

child "must predominate."5' Citing a social worker's testimony that
preventing the Walker children from attending church with their fos4

775 F Supp at 881 n 14.

45 Id at 885.
46 The three Pfoltzer children each lived with a different foster family. One of the children

lived in a Catholic home, attended church and religious instruction classes regularly, and made
his First Communion while in foster care. Another child went to Catholic church irregularly but
did not take any religious classes; he testified that he did not have any interest in such classes.
The third child's foster parents had attempted to take her to church, but they claimed that her
temper tantrums prevented them from doing so. Id at 886.
47
Id. The district court's holding was affirmed in an unpublished opinion. Pfoltzer v Fairfax
County Department of Human Development, 966 F2d 1443 (4th Cir 1992).
48 891 F Supp at 1049.
49
Id at 1047. The court did make a point of noting that the legal mother had, at various
points since her children's placement, asserted she was Catholic, Christian, atheist, and Druid.
Walker testified that she had been joking when she told the caseworker she followed the tenets
of Druidism. Id at 1046.
50

51

Id at 1048.
Id.
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ter family would "segregate" them and make them feel "not part of
the family," the court found that it was unreasonable to require the
foster parents to refrain from including the Walker children in their
religious activities." The court also rejected the legal mother's request
that the children be moved to a Jewish foster home, holding that such
a move would be a "great disruption in their lives" and contrary to
their best interests.53 Finally, the court observed that the foster parents
had complied with some of the legal mother's requests, such as giving
the children certain foods during Passover." Although the foster parents had not attempted to teach the children about the tenets of Judaism," the court concluded that the state had made reasonable efforts
to accommodate the legal mother's religious beliefs and denied her
free exercise claim.5'
3. Reasonable efforts under the compelling interest standard.
Interestingly, neither the Wilder court nor the Pfoltzer or Walker
courts made any reference to the compelling interest standard established by the Supreme Court in Yoder."7 However, the existence of
such state interests is implied in each court's opinion. Although the
legal mother's religious preferences did not jeopardize her children's
actual health and safety, the Walker court asserted that their welfare
would have been compromised by an accommodation of her requests." All three courts noted the difficulty of complying with every
request made by a legal parent regarding her children's religious upbringing. The implication is that the social burden of accommodating
every legal parent's religious preferences is simply too great for the
state to bear. As the Pfoltzer court pointed out, it is unrealistic to expect the state to be able to "place a Buddhist child with a Buddhist
foster family, a Quaker child with a Quaker family, or a Zoroastrian
child with a Zoroastrian family, unless such a family is reasonably and
immediately available."59
The question, of course, is what constitutes reasonable efforts. In
Pfoltzer, the court held that it was unreasonable to expect that the
foster parents take the children to weekly church services on a consis-

Id at 1050.
Id at 1049.
54 Id at 1047.
55
Id.
56
Id at 1050.
57 See notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
58 891 F Supp at 1050.
59 775 F Supp at 885.

52

53
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tent basis.'° The Walker court held that the foster parents did not even
have an obligation to expose the children to the basic tenets of the
Jewish faith." Because the reasonableness of a legal parent's request
necessarily requires a fact-specific inquiry, it is difficult and perhaps
inapposite to make any sweeping claims about which kinds of requests
are reasonable and which are not. Although Part IV discusses this issue at greater length, it is worth noting that the bar set by the Pfoltzer
and Walker courts seems quite low. If it is unreasonable to expect the
state to accommodate a legal parent's request that her children be
exposed to the basic tenets of her religion, it would appear that "reasonable efforts" requires almost no effort by the state at all. As articulated by the Wilder court and this Comment, the reasonable efforts
test takes seriously the interest of legal parents in influencing the religious upbringing of their children in foster care. Unless a legal parent's religious preference places an undue burden on the state or foster parent,6 the reasonableness test-and indeed the Constitutionrequires that efforts be made to accommodate her request.
B.

Post-WilderFree Exercise Jurisprudence and Its Effect on
State Obligations

Two post-Wilder cases raise the question of whether the reasonable efforts standard for legal parents' religious rights remains viable
under current religious exercise jurisprudence. In 1990, the Supreme
Court dramatically shifted its position on religious accommodation in
the landmark case Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v Smith.63 The Court held that the Free Exercise
Clause does not require the government to provide individual exemptions from neutral, generally applicable laws that have the incidental
effect of hindering religious practice.4 However, the Court clearly
stated in its opinion that Smith does not overrule Yoder's requirement
that government interference with parental religious rights be justified
by a compelling state interest.65 Instead, the Smith Court distinguished
Yoder as a case involving "hybrid" rights; that is, a case involving the
Free Exercise Clause "in conjunction with other constitutional protections."" The Court specifically stated that because the plaintiffs in

60

Idat886.

891 F Supp at 1047, 1050.
62
See Part IV.B for a discussion of what constitutes an undue burden on foster parents.
63 494 US 872 (1990).
64 Id at 882.
65
Id at 881, citing Yoder, 406 US 205.
66 494 US at 881 (stating that the additional constitutional protection in Yoder was "the
right of parents.., to direct the education of their children").
61
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Smith made no contention that the law at issue represented an attempt to regulate "the raising of one's children in [particular religious]
beliefs," Yoder did not apply." Accordingly, Wilder's reasonable efforts
test remains valid despite Smith's significant impact on other areas of

free exercise jurisprudence.6'
In Elk Grove Unified School District v Newdow, 6' the father of an
elementary school student claimed that the daily teacher-led recita-

tion of the Pledge of Allegiance in his daughter's elementary school
class violated his religious exercise rights.0 As an atheist, Newdow asserted that he did not want his daughter inculcated with religious beliefs while at school.' The Supreme Court refused to consider the mer-

its of Newdow's claim, holding that he did not have standing to bring
the suit because a family court had granted "exclusive legal custody"
of his daughter to her mother, who objected to the lawsuit." The cus-

tody order gave the mother, Sandra Banning, "the sole right to represent [their daughter's] legal interests and make all decision[s] about
her education.
One might argue that an implication of the Newdow holding is
that when the state takes custody of a child, legal parents are similarly

precluded from constitutionally challenging religious activity or nonactivity in the foster home. However, an important factor in the
Court's decision was the fact that a state court had granted Banning
sole authority to make decisions regarding her daughter's upbringing,
and Banning supported the recitation of the Pledge in her daughter's
classroom.' The Court asserted that Newdow had no right "to forestall
his daughter's exposure to religious ideas that her mother, who wields

a form of veto power, endorses, and to use his parental status to challenge the influences to which his daughter may be exposed in school

when he and Banning disagree.""
Id at 882.
Indeed, Walker and Pfoltzer were each decided after Smith, and both courts correctly
chose not to cite Smith as relevant case law.
69
124 S Ct 2301 (2004).
70 Newdow also claimed that the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance violates the Estab67

68

lishment Clause. The Supreme Court's standing analysis does not distinguish between Newdow's
free exercise and establishment claims.
71 Id at 2305.
72
Id at 2307 (internal citations omitted).
73
Id (internal citations omitted). It is worth noting that in addition to claiming that the
recitation of the Pledge violated his own religious rights, Newdow also brought the suit on his
daughter's behalf, asserting as "next friend" that the Pledge also violated her religious rights. This
"next friend" claim is not discussed here because it does not specifically concern the right of
parents to direct their children's religious upbringing, and therefore it is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
74 See id at 2310-11.
75
Idat2311.
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In contrast, in foster care it is the state, not another parent, that

has custody of the child.6 Unlike Banning, the state is constitutionally

prohibited from having any religious preferences regarding a foster
child's upbringing. As a result, the standing issue in Newdow would
never arise in the context of a legal parent's claim regarding her
child's religious activity or nonactivity in foster care.
Ultimately, then, neither Smith nor Newdow changes the application of Yoder and Wilder to legal parents' religious exercise claims.
These cases continue to impose an obligation on the state to accommodate the religious interests of legal parents to the extent required
by the compelling interest test.
III. THE FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS OF FOSTER CHILDREN

In analyzing the scope of foster children's free exercise rights, the
first issue is the extent to which courts have recognized constitutionally protected religious rights in children generally. Part III.A discusses relevant case law in this area of jurisprudence. Building on this
discussion, Parts III.B and III.C address the more specific inquiries of
this Comment. What role should foster children's religious preferences
play in determining the nature and extent of their religious upbringing
while they are in foster care? And, perhaps more importantly, how
should courts resolve religious conflicts between foster children and
their legal and foster parents?
A. Children and Religious Rights
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Bill of Rights is
not "for adults alone."" As the Court stated in Planned Parenthoodof
Central Missouri v Danforth: "Constitutional rights do not mature and

come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age
' However, the scope of children's
of majority."78
constitutional rights is
not identical to that of adults. This Part discusses the extent to which
courts have recognized the religious rights of children, addressing (1)
cases in which children assert the same religious preferences as their
parents, (2) the extent of children's religious rights when they conflict
with their parents' religious preferences, and (3) the applicability of
76
For the sake of simplicity, this Comment assumes that the legal parent's religious preferences do not conflict with those of another legal parent. Clearly, the analysis of each parent's
religious rights would be different in such a situation.
77
See, for example, In re Gault, 387 US 1, 13 (1967) (holding that the constitutional guarantees of procedural due process must be afforded to juveniles charged with crimes in the same
manner they are applied to adults).
78 428 US 52,74 (1976).
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Smith's neutrality doctrine to foster children's religious exercise
claims.
1. When parent and child assert the same religious interest.
Parents frequently bring free exercise claims on behalf of themselves and their children, often with regard to school policies that re-

strict religious expression. In such cases, courts assume that children
have full constitutional rights to religious exercise, although they tend
to treat the rights of the parent and the rights of the child inter-

changeably. There are also many cases in which children have independently asserted free exercise challenges to state action, and, even

in these cases, courts have consistently recognized the religious exercise rights of children as identical to those of adults." In stark contrast
to the treatment of children's claims in other areas of constitutional
law, courts have treated minority status as virtually irrelevant in determining the scope of children's religious liberty. As Catherine Ross
observed, "By a null hypothesis, the Supreme Court has accepted the
notion that even elementary school children can develop deeply held
religious beliefs that command respect under the Constitution.' 1

2. When parent and child assert conflicting religious interests.
Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the free

religious exercise rights of minors, it has not addressed a situation in
which a child's religious interest conflicts with that of her parents. The
most extensive discussion of this issue is Justice Douglas's dissent in
Yoder." Douglas argued that it was inappropriate for the majority to
conclude that the parents' free exercise rights outweighed the state's

interest in education without considering the religious preferences of
79 See, for example, West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624 (1943)
(striking down the state's practice of punishing Jehovah's Witness school children for failing to
salute the American flag as violative of the Free Exercise Clause, without distinguishing between
the rights of the children and those of their parents).
80 See, for example, Smith v North Babylon Union Free School District,844 F2d 90 (2d Cir
1988) (considering a challenge by an Orthodox Jewish student to the scheduling of a graduation
ceremony on a Saturday); Menora v Illinois High School Association, 683 F2d 1030 (7th Cir
1982) (considering a challenge by Jewish student athletes to a prohibition on headwear during
basketball games). Although these types of claims rarely succeed, even when brought by both
the parent and the child, the outcomes in these cases result from the Court's free exercise doctrine generally and do not relate to the minor status of the plaintiff. See Note, Children as Believers: Minors' Free Exercise Rights and the Psychology of Religious Development, 115 Harv L Rev
2205, 2209-10 (2002) (observing that the outcomes in these cases do not have "anything to do
specifically with the plaintiffs minor status").
81 Catherine J. Ross, An Emerging Right for Mature Minors to Receive Information, 2 U Pa
J Const L 223,265 (1999).
82
406 US at 241-49.
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the children.3 Although fifteen-year-old Frieda Yoder testified that
her own religious views were opposed to public schooling beyond
grade school, there was no evidence in the record that Vernon Yutzy
or Barbara Miller, the other two minors involved the suit, shared their
parents' religious beliefs. Douglas refused to join the Court's judgment with regard to Yutzy and Miller, stating that he was unwilling "to
impose the parents' notions of religious duty upon their children."'"
Despite the absence of Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding
religious conflict between parents and children, it is not uncommon
for minors to hold religious beliefs that differ from those of their parents. One study of children in ninth through eleventh grades found
that 23 percent identified a different religious preference from that of
their parents.8' These conflicts are often raised indirectly in custody
cases. When parents in a custody proceeding disagree about the religious upbringing of their child, it follows that the child does not share
the religious beliefs of at least one parent; there would be no dispute if
the beliefs and/or religious practices were not at least somewhat mutually exclusive.
In child custody cases, courts frequently treat the child's religious
preferences as an important factor in their decisionmaking process. In
Martin v Martin,' the New York Court of Appeals allowed a twelveyear-old child to choose which church he wanted to attend and to decide whether he wanted to remain in parochial school or transfer to
public school." Similarly, in Boerger v Boerger,? a New Jersey appellate court upheld a trial court's decision to consider the religious preference of a ten-year-old child in resolving the parents' dispute over
her religious upbringing.'o
It is interesting to note that both the Walker and Pfoltzer courts
considered the foster children's religious preferences in determining
83

Id at 241-46.

84 Idat243.
85 Idat242.
86 Elizabeth Weiss Ozorak, Social and Cognitive Influences on the Development of Religious Beliefs and Commitment in Adolescence, 28 J Sci Study of Relig 448,455 (1989).
87 308 NY 136, 123 NE2d 812 (1954) (per curiam).
88 Idat812.
89 26 NJ Super 90,97 A2d 419 (1953).
90 Id at 426. See also Andros v Andros, 396 NW2d 917,921-23 (Minn Ct App 1986) (terminating a joint custody arrangement and awarding sole legal custody to the children's mother, in
large part due to religious disagreements between the parents concerning the father's actions in
taking the children to religious events that they told the judge they did not wish to attend);
S.E.L. v J.W.W, 541 NYS2d 675, 143 Misc 2d 455, 460-63 (NY Fam Ct 1989) (denying a petition
for a court order limiting the noncustodial parent's right to practice his religion when his daughter visited him, in part based on the wishes of the child to continue to explore and be exposed to
both of her parents' religious traditions).
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that their legal mothers' free exercise rights had not been violated. In
Pfoltzer, the court observed that one child testified that he did not
attend religious instruction classes because he had no interest in doing
so. 9' The Walker court noted that the plaintiff's four-year-old child told
her social worker that she enjoyed attending Sunday school." Similarly, the Supreme Court noted in Newdow that according to her
mother, Newdow's daughter was a Christian who had no objection to
the Pledge of Allegiance or its reference to God." In response, the
that 'children
Court observed, "[W]e are mindful in cases such as this
'"'
interests.
protectible
themselves have constitutionally
Although none of these cases explicitly recognized an independent religious exercise right in children, each supports the notion that
children can and do hold legitimate religious beliefs independent from
the beliefs of their parents that are deserving of consideration by
courts.
3. The relevance of Smith in the context of foster children's
religious practices.
Smith" has problematic implications for foster children's independent religious rights. As discussed earlier, legal parents are exempt
from Smith's holding that the government has no obligation to accommodate individual religious practices; the Court has specifically
stated that the "hybrid" nature of parental religious exercise rights
renders Smith inapplicable to legal parents' claims regarding the religious upbringing of their children." It is not clear whether the religious rights of foster children also fall under the "hybrid" exception to
Smith,9' and thus one might argue that foster children cannot assert
free exercise challenges to religiously neutral foster care policies that
hinder their religious practice.
In thinking about the applicability of Smith to foster children, it is
important to consider whether generally applicable rules can be religiously neutral when, as in foster care, the "government controls every
775 F Supp at 886.
92 891 F Supp at 1046.
93 124 S Ct at 2307.
94 Id at 2311 n 7, quoting Yoder, 406 US at 243.
95 494 US 872.
96 See Part II.B.
97 Foster children are often able to challenge the nature and quality of care they receive as
a violation of their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Although these types
of due process challenges are most often raised in the context of abuse and neglect by foster
parents, a foster child might be able to claim that a state's failure to protect her ability to practice
her religious beliefs while in state custody constitutes a violation of both her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
91

2005]

Religious Rights for Foster Children and Their Families

341

moment of an individual's day and must either provide or decline to
offer religious facilities."98 In this regard, religious exercise in prisons
provides a useful analog. Unsurprisingly, most circuit courts have decided that Smith does not apply to cases involving the free exercise
rights of prisoners; instead, they continue to apply the prison-specific
constitutional rights test developed by the Supreme Court in Turner v
Safley.9 In Turner, the Court held that "when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."' O
There are, of course, many important differences between prisoners and foster children, and it would thus be unwise to assume that the
Turner test is appropriate in the context of foster care. However, if, as
the vast majority of circuit courts have held, Smith is not applicable to
prisoners' religious exercise challenges because of the unique living
circumstances of prisoners, it should be equally true that Smith does
not control cases involving the religious rights of foster children. This
is a sensible outcome; if the government can refuse to accommodate
the religious interests of individuals under any circumstances, the Free
Exercise Clause has no meaning for individuals in state custody. Regardless of whether Smith's neutrality doctrine is appropriate in other
contexts, it has no place in cases involving religious exercise by individuals whose private lives are controlled entirely by the government.
The circuit courts have consistently recognized the importance of this
distinction, and it is likely that the Supreme Court would do the same
in this context.
B.

The Implications of Cognitive Development for Foster Children's
Religious Rights
As discussed in the preceding Part, it is settled law that children
have religious exercise rights under the First Amendment. Furthermore, current free exercise and child custody jurisprudence indicates
that children's religious interests exist independently from those of
their parents. However, the free exercise rights of children are not
absolute, which raises an important question: what role should foster
Horowitz, Note, 98 Yale L J at 618 (cited in note 23).
482 US 78 (1987). For cases applying Turner, rather than Smith, see Levitan v Ashcroft,
281 F3d 1313, 1318-19 (DC Cir 2002); Kikumura v Hurley, 242 F3d 950, 956 (10th Cir 2001);
Flagner v Wilkinson, 241 F3d 475, 481-82 (6th Cir 2001); Green v Polunsky, 229 F3d 486, 489-91
(5th Cir 2000); Dehart v Horn, 227 F3d 47, 51-61 (3d Cir 2000) (en banc); Hakim v Hicks, 223
F3d 1244, 1247-49 (11th Cir 2000); Ward v Walsh, 1 F3d 873, 876-77 (9th Cir 1993); Salaam v
Lockhart, 905 F2d 1168, 1171 n 7 (8th Cir 1990). But see Hines v South CarolinaDepartmentof
Corrections,148 F3d 353, 357-58 (4th Cir 1998) (applying Smith as well as Turner in assessing
inmates' free exercise challenge to a prison grooming policy).
100 482 US at 89.
98

99
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children's religious preferences play in determining the extent and
nature of their religious activities while in foster care? This Part discusses the implications of child development research regarding the
cognitive capacity of children to assert religious preferences and to
participate in litigation when there are conflicts of religious interest.
In Bellotti v Baird,"' the Supreme Court held that the state must
allow a minor to obtain an abortion if she demonstrates that she is
"mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion de''
cision ...independently of her parents' wishes. .. The Bellotti decision

suggests that when a child has sufficient capacity to exercise a constitutional right independently and it is burdensome to require her to
protected1'
wait until adulthood to do so, that right is constitutionallyadherence,"'
immediate
demand
convictions
"[r]eligious
that
Given
this standard supports the recognition of children's independent free
exercise rights when a child is sufficiently mature to articulate a religious identityY
A recent literature review regarding children's religious development concluded that "psychological evidence suggests that even
relatively young children can have personally meaningful religious
beliefs that, from a cognitive perspective, do not differ dramatically
from those of adults."' ' Robert Coles has performed extensive qualitative research in the field of children's religious beliefs. In his influen-

tial book The Spiritual Life of Children, Coles chronicled more than

thirty years of interviews with children between the ages of six and
thirteen about religious and spiritual beliefs." Coles found that children "were eager... to speak of their religious and spiritual interests,
concerns, worries, beliefs.""' Coles ultimately concluded that children
are religious seekers, "young pilgrims well aware that life is a finite
journey and as anxious to make sense of it as those of us who are farther along in the time allotted us.""' Indeed, other researchers have

101 443 US 622 (1979).
102 Id at 643.
103 See Buss, 2 U Pa J Const L at 63 (cited in note 4).
104 Id.
105 See, for example, Alabama and Coushatta Tribes of Texas v Trustees of the Big Sandy
Independent School District, 817 F Supp 1319, 1328-30 (ED Tex 1993) (recognizing that the
"sincerely held religious belief[s]" of twelve Native American students, ranging from fifth grade
to eleventh grade, were protected under the Free Exercise Clause).
106 Note, 115 Harv L Rev at 2226 (cited in note 80).
107 Robert Coles, The SpiritualLife of Children xi, 36 (Houghton Mifflin 1990).
108Id at 340 n 7.
109 Id at xvi.
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found that children are cognitively capable of holding adult-like religious beliefs around the age of seven. '
However, the ability of children to hold meaningful religious beliefs does not necessarily indicate that they are capable of holding
adult-like roles in litigation regarding religious exercise conflicts. Numerous researchers have written about the difficulties of engaging
children in the litigation process, particularly when the litigation involves a conflict between the child's parents or legal guardians.111 A
legal inquiry into a child's religious preferences can, in some circumstances, be emotionally harmful. " ' Specifically, asking a child to publicly take a position that undermines her familial relationships could
cause psychological damage, yielding either "useless information (inspired by the child's distrust of the process), or traumatic and costly
disclosure.."1 Although the likelihood of such harm is considerably
reduced when, as in foster care, "[t]he original family arrangement has
been destroyed,"1. it is important to consider the emotional impact of
inquiring into the religious preferences of foster children when free
exercise litigation arises.
This body of scholarship suggests that the role of foster children's
religious preferences in resolving free exercise conflicts must be tapered in some circumstances in order to protect the child's welfare.
When legal parents or foster parents initiate religious exercise litigation, courts should use caution in inquiring into the religious beliefs of
the child. Unless a child expresses a clear interest in asserting her religious beliefs before the court, there is no reason to include her as an
individual party in the litigation or even to subject her to a public inquiry of her religious views. If the child's preferences are important to
110 See Pascal Boyer and Sheila Walker, Intuitive Ontology and CulturalInput in the Acquisition of Religious Concepts, in Karl S. Rosengren, Carl N. Johnson, and Paul L. Harris, eds, Imagining the Impossible:Magical, Scientific, and Religious Thinking in Children 130, 147 (Cambridge
2000) (highlighting the differences in children over the age of seven that allow for more adultlike religious views and attributing those differences to a conceptual ability to make counterintuitive assumptions and distinguish fact from fiction).
111 See, for example, Emily Buss, Confronting Developmental Barriersto the Empowerment
of Child Clients, 84 Cornell L Rev 895, 933 (1999) (concluding that "younger children's lessdeveloped language skills and their immature understanding of themselves, their lawyers, and
the relationship between the two all serve to distort children's reporting of their viewpoints to
their lawyers and the lawyers' interpretation of those viewpoints"); William J. Mlyniec, A Judge's
Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a Child's Capacity to Choose, 64 Fordham L Rev 1873, 1915 (1996)
(describing the difficulties judges face in determining whether a child involved in litigation has
the decisionnaking capacity to engage in "informed consent dialogue"). See also Cynthia
Starnes, Swords in the Hands of Babes: Rethinking Custody Interviews After Troxel, 2003 Wis L
Rev 115 (discussing various techniques for effectively engaging children in custody hearings).
112 See Buss, 2 U Pa J Const L at 55 (cited in note 4).
113 Id at 67.
114 Id at 71.
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the resolution of the case, they should be solicited with as little intrusion as possible and with sensitivity to the potential harm of asking a
child to express opinions that undermine her emotional bond with her
legal parents or foster parents.
However, foster children who have legitimate religious preferences and want to assert them in court have a constitutional right to
do so. This is true not only in the context of litigation initiated by a
legal parent or foster parent, but also if a child wants to initiate such
litigation on her own. Suppose that a fourteen-year-old boy in foster
care decides that he would like to join a weekly Bible study at a local
church. His legal parents are atheists who object to his participation in
any religious activity, and his foster parents are Muslim and refuse to
allow him to attend the Bible study. Because the state is responsible
for any action or nonaction taken by the foster parents that infringes
upon a foster child's constitutional rights, he can legitimately claim
that his free exercise rights have been violated. If he wants to challenge his foster parents' actions before a judge, his lawyer"' has an
obligation to initiate litigation on his behalf, and the court has an obligation to take his claim seriously.
C.

Resolving Religious Conflicts Between Foster Children and Their
Legal and Foster Parents

When foster children object to the religious preferences of their
legal or foster parents, the most obvious solution is to allow courts to
resolve the conflict simply on the basis of the child's best interest. Indeed, the best interest of the child is a sufficient state interest to justify
nonaccommodation of any of the parties' religious preferences. The
Constitution does not require the state to allow a child in its custody
to participate in unhealthy or dangerous religious activities as a matter of free exercise.
Most religious practices, however, are not inconsistent with a
child's welfare. If a legal parent is Jewish and her child wants to convert to Catholicism, the notion of a judge deciding that one set of religious beliefs is "better" for the child than the other is problematic. If
nothing else, the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from
favoring some religions over others. If judges are given complete discretion in resolving religious conflicts between foster children and
their parents, they are put in a position where, all else being equal,
they must choose between religious preferences solely on the basis of
the "merits" of the religions. The best interests inquiry is crucial
115 When children enter foster care, they are assigned a "child advocate"-that is, a lawyer-who represents their interests in court.
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in these cases, but it is not sufficient in itself; a burden of proof regarding best interests must be placed on either one party or the other. In
Parts III.C.1 and III.C.2, I argue that foster children should be entitled
to a presumption that the religious preferences they articulate are
consistent with their best interests. This means that, unless this presumption is overridden, the state is obligated to make reasonable efforts to accommodate the foster children's voluntarily expressed religious preferences. In the context of religious conflicts between foster
children and their legal parents, this presumption privileges the foster
child's religious preferences over those of her legal parents.
1. Reasonable efforts in the context of foster children's
.religious preferences.
The first issue with regard to children's religious rights is the extent to which foster parents are obligated to facilitate the religious
practices of foster children. The most obvious and sensible answer is
that foster children, like legal parents, are entitled to reasonable efforts to accommodate their religious interests. This is consistent with
the Second Circuit's Wilder opinion, which specifically stated that the
reasonable efforts test applies to the religious interests of both legal
parents and foster children. '" Unless the state can show that a child's
religious preferences are not consistent with her best interest, religious conflicts between foster parents and foster children should be
resolved according to a court's determination of whether the foster
parents have engaged in reasonable efforts to accommodate the religious preferences of the child.
2. Resolving religious conflicts between foster children and their
legal parents.
If foster children and legal parents both have a right to reasonable efforts to accommodate their religious beliefs, what happens if a
child disagrees with her legal parents' preferences regarding her religious upbringing? Neither party's rights are absolute. The legal parents' religious rights are truncated by the fact that their children are in
state custody because they are unable to provide adequate care for
them. The religious rights of children are limited to the extent that
they lack the maturity to exercise such rights fully. However, if a child
has the capacity to articulate reasonably a religious identity and wants
to do so in court, the fact that she is in foster care does not in itself
justify restricting her religious liberty. In this sense, the child can make
116

848 F2d at 1347.
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a better argument than her parents as to why the state should honor
her religious preferences.
This conclusion may seem inconsistent with our usual assumption
that parents have a right to determine the religious upbringing of their
children.' However, one basis of this assumption is the fact that most
children cannot raise religious exercise challenges when they clash
with their parents over religious activity; when the state is not actively
involved in a child's rearing, she cannot claim that her parents' actions
violate the Free Exercise Clause. Our assumption of absolute parental
liberty is also premised on the notion that a parent has not taken any
actions that justify restricting her authority over her children. Clearly,
this assumption is not appropriate when a parent has lost custody of
her children because of her inability to care adequately for them.
Courts have repeatedly recognized that the parental liberty interests
of legal parents are significantly abridged by the fact that their children are in foster care.
Furthermore, if a foster child chooses to express religious preferences that differ from those of her legal parents, her best interests require that courts take these preferences seriously. The religious beliefs
of children are heavily influenced by the people they trust and feel
close to.1 9 Although we usually assume that children are closely
bonded to their parents, a tragic reality is that the emotional lives of
foster children rarely have much resemblance to those of children
from stable families. The psychological damage of parental abuse and
the trauma of living under state custody affect each child differently,
and it is often difficult to determine with whom a foster child is most
closely connected.'2' Needless to say, it is important that courts protect
and honor the emotional bonds that foster children are able to develop whenever possible.'2' When a child says, "I like going to temple
117 For a critique of this assumption, see James G. Dwyer, Parents'Religion and Children's
Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 Cal L Rev 1371, 1423-46 (1994) (challenging the idea of parental rights and using the religious context-where parental rights are particularly strong-to illustrate the problematic nature of parental rights).
118 See, for example, Pfoltzer,775 F Supp at 881-82.
119 See Lee A. Kirkpatrick and Phillip R. Shaver, Attachment Theory and Religion: Childhood Attachments, Religious Beliefs, and Conversion, 29 J Sci Study of Relig 315, 320 (1990)
(using Freudian attachment theory as a framework to analyze the development of children's
religious beliefs).
120 See Daniel J. Pilowsky and Wendy G. Kates, Foster Children in Acute Crisis:Assessing
CriticalAspectsof Attachment,35 J Am Acad Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 1095,1096 (1996).
As the Supreme Court observed in Smith v Organizationof Foster Families for Equality and
Reform, "The foster child's loyalties, emotional involvements, and responsibilities are often
divided among three adult authority figures-the natural parents, the foster parent, and the
social worker." 431 US 816,826 n 16 (1977).
121 See Pilowsky and Kates, 35 J Am Acad Child & Adolescent Psychiatry at 1097 (cited in
note 120).
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with my foster parents and siblings, it makes me feel like a part of the
family," she is informing the court as to what activities contribute to
her psychological welfare.
On a similar note, researchers have found that religious participation among adolescents is statistically associated with feelings of hope,
will, purpose, love, care, and self-esteem.'i If a sixteen-year-old wants
to become involved with a local church, she can make a good argument that it is in her best interest to do so. Conversely, if a foster child
dislikes following her legal mother's religious preferences so intensely
that she pursues litigation, this suggests that such activities are contrary to her psychological well-being.
In this sense, when a court privileges the reasonably articulated
religious preferences of a minor over those of her legal parents, it is
taking cues from the child regarding her best interest. Thus, both a
rights perspective and a child welfare perspective indicate that when a
child is capable of holding legitimate religious beliefs and reasonably
articulating a religious preference, her religious interests should take
precedence over those of her legal parents.
Privileging foster children's religious preferences can thus be understood as a presumption about best interests that can be overridden
if the court finds that the child's preferred religious practices are not
consistent with her well-being. In such cases, the state's compelling
interest in promoting her welfare justifies restricting her religious liberty. Because children are vulnerable to manipulation, it is not inappropriate for a court to inquire into the nature of the religious activities in which the child wants to participate; if a child wants to join a
cult and engage in activities contrary to her best interest, a court could
conclude that she does not have the capacity to make mature religious
decisions, and, consequently, her preferences are not protected under
the Free Exercise Clause.
IV. THE FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS OF FOSTER PARENTS

In the event of a conflict between a foster parent's religious preferences and a legal parent's or a foster child's religious preferences, a

foster parent might make two potential claims under the Free Exercise Clause. The first is that foster parents, like biological parents, have
a constitutional right under Yoder to "direct the religious upbringing"
of children in their care.2 Part IV.A addresses this claim and concludes that foster parents have no constitutionally protected interest
122 See Carol A. Markstrom, Religious Involvement and Adolescent Psychosocial
Development, 22 J Adolescence 205,212 (1999).
123 406 US at 233.
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in determining the religious training of foster children in their care.
The second claim is that when the state requires a foster parent to
accommodate the religious preferences of legal parents and foster
children, it unconstitutionally restricts the foster parent's own religious activity. Part IV.B discusses the application of the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine to religious expression by foster parents,
arguing that the Free Exercise Clause does in fact limit the state's
ability to impose conditions on foster parenting that prevent foster
parents from practicing their own religious beliefs. Given this constitutional interest of foster parents in not accommodating the religious
preferences of legal parents and foster children, Part IV.C asserts that
the reasonable efforts test articulated in Parts II and III should be
understood as a balancing inquiry, creating not only a floor with regard to such accommodation, but also a ceiling.
A. Free Exercise Rights of Foster Parents Regarding the Religious
Upbringing of Children in Their Home
Foster parents have very few rights with regard to the children
placed in their homes. The structure of the foster care system is such
that foster parents are treated much like employees who have wide
discretion in the execution of their duties but who are at all times subject to the authority of their employer. Although foster parents necessarily make many decisions regarding the rearing of the foster children in their homes, the foster care agency and the state can and will
intervene at any time if there is reason to believe that the foster parent is not serving the child's best interests. The agency will usually solicit the input of foster parents with regard to important health, religious, and educational decisions, but it is ultimately the state that
makes such decisions. If legal parents disapprove of any aspect of their
child's care, their complaint is heard in a court hearing at which the
'
foster parents have no standing. Foster parents cannot initiate such
hearings themselves. Thus, from a statutory perspective, foster parents
have no authority regarding the religious upbringing of children in
their care.
Courts have consistently affirmed that foster parents have very
little constitutionally protected interest in their foster children. In
Smith v Organizationof Foster Familiesfor Equality and Reform,' an
organization of foster parents challenged New York's procedure for
removing children from foster homes, arguing that the psychological
Three parties have standing at such hearings: the legal parents, the state, and the child.
The legal parents and the child are each provided with legal representation by the state.
125 431 US 816 (1977).
124
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tie between foster parents and foster children creates a liberty interest
that entitles foster parents to "the same constitutional deference as
that long granted to the ...biological family. 2. In its opinion rejecting

such deference, the Supreme Court observed that granting foster parents this sort of procedural due process protection would create a direct conflict with the substantive due process rights of legal parents in
attempting to reunify with their children."' Although the Court refrained from holding that foster parents have no liberty interests in
their foster children, it did find that the minimalist procedures used to
remove children were constitutionally sufficient to protect whatever
liberty interests may exist."
Likewise, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have both held that foster parents have no liberty interest in their foster children. In Drummond v Fulton County Department of Family & Children's Services,'"

the Fifth Circuit found that the relationship between foster parents
and foster children is "temporary at the outset" and "gives rise to no
state created rights in the foster parents.13. In Procopio v Johnson," '
the Seventh Circuit adopted the same rationale, holding that the
state's "ultimate power to terminate [foster placement] arrangements
...is dispositive.'. 2

It is thus evident that the limitations on the rights of foster parents with regard to their foster children are quite severe. It is very
unlikely that any court would find that foster parents have a parental
right to determine the religious upbringing of the children placed in
their homes.
B.

Unconstitutional Conditions on the Religious Exercise of
Foster Parents
The free exercise claim of foster parents instead resides in the
fact that accommodating the religious interests of legal parents and
foster children may, in some circumstances, limit the religious activity
of the foster parent. Prohibiting foster parents from displaying reliId at 839-40.
Id at 846-47.
Id at 849-56. These procedures included ten days' advanced notice of removal, a preremoval conference with the social service department, and an administrative hearing subject to
judicial review. See id at 820,853.
129 563 F2d 1200 (5th Cir 1977).
130 Id at 1207.
131 994 F2d 325 (7th Cir 1993).
132 Id at 330 (affirming the lower court's dismissal of foster parents' suit seeking to regain
custody of their former foster child from his legal parent, who had been an active drug addict at
the time of the child's birth, because neither state nor federal law created in a foster family relationship a liberty interest entitled to due process protections).
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gious icons, praying before meals, or leaving children in Sunday school
while they attend religious services could constitute a severe restric-

tion of their religious exercise. Similarly, requiring foster parents to
facilitate the religious activity of children who practice a different
faith might force foster parents to engage in activities inconsistent
with their own religious beliefs.

Although foster parents choose whether to accept foster children
into their home, the Supreme Court has held that the voluntary nature
of employment does not justify unreasonable infringement of a public
employee's liberty interests.1 This doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that the government cannot require public employees (or
independent government contractors) to waive their constitutional
rights as a condition of employment."" However, this protection is not
absolute; if there is sufficient cause, the government can impose restrictions on the constitutional rights of its employees that it cannot
similarly impose on private citizens. As the Court stated in Waters v
Churchill,. "the government as employer ...has far broader powers
than does the government as sovereign..'.

The Supreme Court has never addressed the scope of protected
religious expression for government employees. However, numerous
circuits have decided cases involving religious speech in public workplaces. In many of these cases, the courts have adopted a balancing

approach, based on the test formulated by the Supreme Court in
37 to determine the extent of public
Pickering v Board of Education'
employees' free speech rights.' In Pickering, the Court attempted to

133 See, for example, United States v National Treasury Employees Union, 513 US 454 (1995)
(striking down a ban on public employees accepting honoraria as an infringement on First
Amendment protections that are not relinquished by those accepting government employment);
Rankin v McPherson, 483 US 378 (1987) (holding that public employees cannot be dismissed for
speech on a matter of public concern, even if the content is disagreeable to their employers);
Keyishian v Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, 385 US 589 (1967) (holding that public employees cannot be dismissed for refusing to take an oath regarding their political affiliation because the requirement would stifle personal liberty).
134 See Keyishian, 385 US at 591-93. See also Board of County Commissioners v Umbehr,
518 US 668 (1996) (holding that unconstitutional conditions protection covers independent
government contractors).
135 511 US 661 (1994) (holding that a government employer may fire an employee if the
employer reasonably believes that the employee's statement was not on a matter of public concern or that the potential injury the speech could cause to the government's interests outweighs
the employee's interest in self-expression).
136 Id at 671.
137 391 US 563, 573-74 (1968) (holding that a government employee's interest in public
expression must be balanced against the state's interest in promoting efficient public services).
138 See, for example, Shaharv Bowers, 114 F3d 1097,1103 (11th Cir 1997) (en banc) (relying
on the Pickering test in concluding that the state's interests in promoting efficiency and preventing confusion outweighed the employee's associational rights in keeping her job despite her
same-sex marriage); Tucker v CaliforniaDepartmentof Education,97 F3d 1204,1210-14 (9th Cir
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balance the interests of the employee, as a citizen, in "commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.' 39
In the context of religious expression in public workplaces, appel-

late courts have weighed the burden that a governmental restriction
places on the employee's religious exercise against the interest of the

state in prohibiting such expression as a matter of workplace efficiency and religious establishment concerns. Under this balancing approach, the Eighth Circuit upheld the right of a government employee
to discuss his religious beliefs with coworkers, to pray at work, and to

display a Bible and religious plaques in his office.' 4° Similarly, the
Ninth Circuit held that the government's interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation did not outweigh the interest of an employee in exercising his religious beliefs by placing the phrase "Servant of the Lord Jesus Christ" after his name on the label of a software program he developed."' In contrast, numerous courts have held

that Establishment Clause concerns do outweigh the right of public
school teachers to religious expression in their classrooms, given the
likelihood that students will perceive such expression as an endorsement of religion by their school."2
The cases discussed above are limited in their applicability to re-

ligious activity in foster homes for two important reasons. First, unlike
the lives of other government employees and contractors, the life of a
foster parent cannot be divided into a public "on-duty" sphere and a

private "off-duty" sphere. Foster parents are "at work" twenty-four
hours a day, much of which is spent in their own private homes. A
school teacher who cannot display religious icons or pray in her class-

room may still engage in such expression when she leaves school. A
1996) (holding that a ban on public employees engaging in religious advocacy and displaying
religious materials outside their offices unreasonably infringed on employees' First Amendment
rights because, under Pickering, the state had no legitimate interest in enforcing the policy);
Brown v Polk County, Iowa, 61 F3d 650, 658-59 (8th Cir 1995) (en banc) (holding that prohibiting a public employee from proselytizing on the job violated the employee's First Amendment
rights under Pickering because the state employer could provide no evidence of disruption or
inefficiency); Baz v Walters, 782 F2d 701, 708-09 (7th Cir 1986) (holding that, under Pickering,
the discharge of a chaplain from a Veterans Administration hospital because his proselytizing
interfered with his work did not violate the chaplain's First Amendment rights).
139 391 US at 568.
140 Brown, 61 F3d at 658-59.
141 Tucker, 97 F3d at 1208-14.
142 See, for example, Peloza v Capistrano Unified School District, 37 F3d 517 (9th Cir 1994)
(upholding a school district's ban on a science teacher discussing religion with students during
the school day); Roberts v Madigan, 921 F2d 1047 (10th Cir 1990) (upholding a school district's
decision to remove religiously oriented books from a classroom library and instruct a teacher
that he could not read his Bible silently in sight of students during school hours).
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foster parent who cannot display religious icons or pray in her home
likely has no other sphere in which to practice her religious beliefs.
Thus, the burden of governmental restrictions on religious exercise in
foster homes is much greater than in public workplaces.
Second, the government interest at issue in regulating religious
activity in foster homes does not center on religious establishment
concerns'43 but instead involves the protection of other people's religious exercise rights. While courts are frequently called on to balance
conflicting constitutional values, this is largely uncharted legal territory: how can a court decide whether one person's religious exercise
right is more important than someone else's?
When Foster Parents' Religious Interests Conflict with Those of
Legal Parents and Foster Children
The question raised by such conflicts, then, is this: when the government requires a foster parent to accommodate the religious exercise of a child in her care, is the burden of that requirement on the
foster parent's religious activity outweighed by the interest of the state
in protecting the religious interests of the child and/or legal parents?
There is, of course, no bright-line rule that can be applied in such
cases. However, it seems that the best outcome to a balancing inquiry
in this context should coincide with the result of the reasonable efforts
test articulated by the Wilder court.'" For example, it seems reasonable
to ask a foster parent to refrain from reading religious texts to a child
in her care; it is not reasonable to ask her to refrain from praying in
her home. The reasonable efforts test can thus be understood as defining not only the scope of the legal parent's and the foster child's religious rights, but also the scope of the foster parent's religious rights:
the legal parent and the foster child are each entitled to at least reasonable efforts to accommodate their beliefs, while the foster parent is
entitled to make no more than reasonable efforts with regard to such
accommodation.
This approach to reasonable efforts does not provide an easy
resolution to all religious conflicts. Is it reasonable to prohibit a foster
parent from ever taking foster children to her place of worship? Is it
reasonable to require a foster parent to take a child to religious services on a monthly basis? A weekly basis? A daily basis? These are
clearly difficult questions. Still, an interpretation of reasonable efforts
that takes into consideration the religious interests of foster parents
would both provide a guideline to courts in resolving such conflicts
C.

143
144

See Part I.A.
See text accompanying notes 19-22.
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and ensure that the state does not place unconstitutional conditions
on the work done by foster parents.
CONCLUSION

The foster care system creates a situation in which the state is inextricably involved in mediating religious exercise conflict. As discussed, the Wilder reasonable efforts test provides a constitutionally
sound compromise between the religious rights of legal parents, foster
parents, and foster children. Regardless of the legal parent's or the
foster child's religious preferences, a foster parent is not obligated to
take a child to religious services three times a day; such accommodation is unreasonable and not required by the Free Exercise Clause.
Conversely, legal parents and foster children do have a constitutional
right to accommodation of reasonable religious preferences, such as
refraining from or engaging in prayer and the study of religious texts.
However, many gray areas exist between reasonableness and unreasonableness. Can a legal father demand that foster parents refrain
from leaving his child in Sunday school while they attend worship services? Is a foster child entitled to twice-weekly transportation to
youth group at a church thirty minutes from her home? Under the
standard set by the Walker and Pfoltzer courts, such preferences are
likely unreasonable, but this is not necessarily the correct outcome. In
the absence of substantial case law regarding the application of the
reasonable efforts test, many important decisions loom ahead. Above
all, courts and child welfare agencies must fulfill their obligation to
mediate when these types of religious conflict arise. The First Amendment and the child's best interest require that the state take seriously
the religious rights of foster children, their legal parents, and the foster
parents who care for them.

